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I. INTRODUCTION

Persons accused of a crime, of course, have the constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel. 1 When that right is violated, defendants routinely seek a remedy through an appeal or a
post-conviction proceeding. Until New Years Eve 2002, when the
2
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Grant,
defendants in Pennsylvania had to raise any ineffectiveness issues
in their direct appeal or suffer waiver of those issues. 3 Grant,
however, changed the procedure to defer ineffectiveness issues to
4
the post-conviction stage.
The constitutional problem with this construct in Pennsylvania
comes from the requirement that post-conviction relief only is
available to those defendants currently serving a sentence. 5 If a
defendant's sentence is so short that he or she will be unable to
fully litigate an ineffectiveness issue before the sentence is com1. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
2. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
3. See Commonwealth v. Dancer, 331 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1975), abrogated by Grant, 813
A.2d 726; Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1977), abrogated by Grant, 813
A.2d 726; see also infra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
4. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
5. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (1998); Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718,
720 (Pa. 1997); see infra notes 60-61, 174-75, 203-07 and accompanying text.
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pleted, the defendant will be deprived of any forum in which to
seek enforcement of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
When faced with an opportunity to correct this problem in 2005,
6
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. O'Berg,
held that a short-sentence exception to Grant does not exist. 7 This
means that defendants in that situation - innocent and guilty
alike - must suffer the consequences of their conviction even if it
occurred because trial counsel was not constitutionally effective.
This article will examine whether a state may divest a criminal
defendant of any opportunity to argue that his or her trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective. This analysis will be made by
considering Pennsylvania's system for litigating ineffectiveness
issues and then by comparing it to constitutional standards governing counsel and the appellate process. The conclusion reached
is that all defendants, regardless of the length of the sentence or
the seriousness of the crime, have the constitutional right to argue
that their trial attorney was ineffective.
The first part of this article will review the recent change in
Pennsylvania case law that transformed the principle that ineffectiveness issues had to be raised on direct appeal to the requirement that they must be deferred to the post-conviction stage. The
following section then examines the role of counsel in a criminal
trial and how the right to counsel is the bedrock right that makes
a fair trial possible. The article next discusses Pennsylvania's
constitutional right to an appeal and whether this right is violated
when short-sentence defendants may not ever argue on appeal
that their attorney was constitutionally ineffective. After recognizing the right to an appeal, the next section then turns to a discussion of how due process guarantees assure that any appeal
must be meaningful and must provide an adequate opportunity to
litigate the issues to be raised. These due process guarantees apply to all defendants regardless of the length of their sentence and
regardless of whether they are charged with less serious misdemeanors or more serious felonies.
This leads to the conclusion that defendants have a constitutional right to argue that their trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective. A state, such as Pennsylvania, may not create a system that deprives criminal defendants of every opportunity to vindicate their constitutional right to effective assistance of trial
6.
7.

880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005).
O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 598.
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counsel. This article ends by suggesting six different ways that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and/or the Pennsylvania Legislature could modify the appellate or post-conviction system to allow short-sentence defendants one opportunity to argue that they
have been wrongly convicted because of the errors of their attorney.

II. LITIGATING INEFFECTIVENESS ISSUES IN PENNSYLVANIA
COURTS
A.

The Old Requirement That Ineffectiveness Issues Had to Be
Raised on Direct Appeal

From 1975 through the end of 2002, defendants in Pennsylvania
were required on appeal to raise issues concerning the ineffectiveness of their trial counsel or the issues would be waived. This
started as a general rule and quickly became absolute.
In Commonwealth v. Dancer,8 decided in 1975, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced that, in general, ineffectiveness
claims must be raised on direct appeal or else they will be deemed
waived. 9 The court, however, recognized that this general rule
required exceptions. The notable exceptions were that ineffectiveness issues did not have to be raised on direct appeal to avoid
waiver when the appellate attorney was also the trial attorney
and when the grounds for the ineffectiveness issue were not apparent on the existing record. 10
Two years later, the supreme court made the Dancer rule absolute in Commonwealth v. Hubbard." There, the court held that
"ineffectiveness of prior counsel must be raised as an issue at the
earliest stage in the proceedings at which the counsel whose effec8. 331 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1975), abrogated by Grant, 813 A.2d 726.
9. Dancer,331 A.2d at 437-38.
10. Id. at 438. The Dancer court stated that ineffectiveness issues need not be raised
on direct appeal:
1) where petitioner is represented on appeal by his trial counsel, for it is unrealistic to expect trial counsel on direct appeal to argue his own ineffectiveness,
2) where the petitioner is represented on appeal by new counsel, but the
grounds upon which the claim of ineffective assistance are based do not appear
in the trial record, 3) where the petitioner is able to prove the existence of other
"extraordinary circumstances" justifying his failure to raise the issue ... or 4)
where the petitioner rebuts the presumption of "knowing and understanding
failure."
Id. (quoting Post Conviction Hearing Act, 19 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1180-4(b)(2), 1180-4(c)
(1965), repealed and replaced by Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 95419546 (1998)).
11. 372 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1977), abrogatedby Grant, 813 A.2d 726.
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12
tiveness is being challenged no longer represents the defendant."
This was true even if, as in that case, the new attorney only began
representing the defendant during the brief post-sentence stage
that lasted a mere ten days. 13
If an ineffectiveness argument was not made on direct appeal, it
could then be subsequently raised in a petition filed pursuant to
the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 14 though it faced additional hurdles. 15 Under the PCRA, a defendant could raise a
claim when "the conviction or sentence resulted from
[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place."'16 To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, however, the
defendant had to currently be serving a sentence. 17
Through the end of 2002, any defendant had an opportunity to
raise any ineffectiveness claims in a direct appeal. Though defendants with short sentences that had expired could not allege counsel's ineffectiveness under the PCRA, they at least had that one
opportunity to raise the ineffectiveness issue on their direct appeal.

B.

The Sea Change of Commonwealth v. Grant

This all changed on the final day of 2002 when the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Commonwealth v.
Grant.18 Without being asked to do so by either party, 19 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that ineffectiveness issues no longer
12.
13.

Hubbard,372 A.2d at 695 n.6.
Id. at 695.

14.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-9546.

15. For an analysis of the how the PCRA works, see Donald J. Harris, Kim Nieves &
Thomas M. Place, Dispatch and Delay: Post Conviction Relief Act Litigation in Non-Capital
Cases, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 467, 468-474 (2003).
16. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). The defendant at this stage would have to allege not only that trial counsel was ineffective, but also that prior appellate counsel also
was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that trial counsel was ineffective. This process
became know as "layering" the ineffectiveness claims, meaning that multiple layers of
ineffectiveness needed to be proven. See Commonwealth v. Clayton, 816 A.2d 217, 219-20
(Pa. 2002). In other words, the defendant would have to prove that Counsel B was ineffective for failing to allege that Counsel A was ineffective.
17. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1)(i); see infra notes 60-61, 174-75, 203-07 and accompanying text.
18. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
19. "[N]either party to this appeal advocates departure from present practice. Further,
the view of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, acting as amicus curiae,aligns with that
of the parties ... " Grant, 813 A.2d at 740 (Saylor, J., concurring).
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must be raised on direct appeal to avoid waiving these claims,
overruling Hubbard and Dancer.20 In a nutshell, the court believed that the better practice would be to defer 2' ineffectiveness
arguments until the post-conviction stage rather than to require
them on direct appeal.
The Grant court listed several main reasons for this shift. First,
it said that "appellate courts in Pennsylvania routinely decline to
entertain issues raised on appeal for the first time." 22 In virtually
all cases, ineffectiveness arguments, by their nature, have never
been raised prior to the appeal. 23 Because the trial court observed
counsel's performance during the trial, it should be "in the best
position to make findings related to both the quality of trial counsel's performance and the impact of any shortfalls in that repre24
sentation."
Second, the court said that the lack of a trial court opinion creates an impediment to appellate review. 25 In Pennsylvania, all
appellants, when ordered to do so, must file a Rule 1925(b) statement, which informs the trial court of what issues will be raised
on appeal. 26 From this statement, the trial court writes its opinion. 27 Presumably, the court believes that a trial court opinion
cannot be written on an ineffectiveness issue when that issue was

20. Id. at 738 (majority opinion).
21. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has come to refer to Grant's mandate as a "deferral rule." See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822 (Pa. 2005) ("general rule of deferral announced in Grant"), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 564 (2005); Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826
A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003) (referring to this circumstance as an exception to the general rule of
deferral in Grant).
22. Grant, 813 A.2d at 733. The court pointed out that "the Pennsylvania Appellate
Rules of Procedure specifically proscribe such review." Id. (citing PA. R. APP. P. 302(a)).
23. The exception to this is when a timely post-sentence motion has been filed alleging
trial counsel's ineffectiveness. In this one scenario, the ineffectiveness issue has been presented before the appeal has begun. See Bomar, 826 A.2d at 853-55; see also infra notes 6970 and accompanying text (discussing Bomar).
24. Grant, 813 A.2d at 736.
25. Id. at 733-34 (citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998)).
26. PA. R. APP.P. 1925(b). The purpose of the Rule 1925(b) statement is "to aid appellate review by providing a trial court the opportunity to focus its opinion upon only those
issues that the appellant plans to raise on appeal." Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d
775, 778 (Pa. 2005). This "allows for meaningful and effective appellate review." Commonwealth v. Schofield, 888 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. 2005). Under Rule 1925(b), the statement
must be filed within fourteen days of when the trial court orders it to be filed, though this
time can be extended to allow for preparation of the transcripts and for counsel to have an
opportunity to review them. Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 705 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999). If additional time is needed to prepare the statement, it can be requested. Castillo,
888 A.2d at 778.
27. PA. R. APP. P. 1925(a).
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only presented to it in the Rule 1925(b) statement rather than
28
during trial proceedings.
Third, the supreme court in Grant observed that "appellate
courts normally do not consider matters outside the record or matters that involve a consideration of facts not in evidence." 29 Part
of the nature of an ineffectiveness claim is that the trial attorney
must not have had a reasonable basis for his or her actions or
omissions. 30 In most cases, this only can be gleaned from questioning the trial attorney, which is evidence that would be outside
of the record on appeal.
Fourth, and "[m]ost importantly" for the supreme court, "appellate courts do not act as fact finders, since to do so 'would require
an assessment of the credibility of the testimony and that is
clearly not our function.' 3 1 The court pointed out that in deciding
ineffectiveness arguments, "appellate courts often engage in some
fact finding by being required to speculate as to the trial strategy
of trial counsel in order to rule upon these claims. ' 32 In other
words, an appellate court is not in the business of judging the
credibility of witnesses who would testify about the attorney's alleged ineffectiveness or weighing the new evidence that might be
part of an ineffectiveness claim. Instead, these functions properly
rest in the trial court.
Finally, the Grant court said that it was concerned about the
toll that the Dancer/Hubbardrule took on appellate attorneys who
were required to raise not just record-based claims, but also any
28. Commonwealth v. Davido, 868 A.2d 431, 441 n.16 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
660 (2005). Prior to Grant, courts routinely would write opinions on ineffectiveness issues
raised for the first time in the Rule 1925(b) statement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. D'Collanfield, 805 A.2d 1244, 1245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (pointing out that one of the defendant's
issues was the ineffectiveness of trial counsel and the trial court wrote an opinion on this
issue).
29. Grant, 813 A.2d at 734 (citing Commonwealth v. Rios, 684 A.2d 1025, 1036 n.11
(Pa. 1996)).
30. Id. at 736 ('"Many of these [ineffectiveness] claims are based on omissions, which, by
their very nature, do not appear on the record and thus, require further fact-finding, extrarecord investigation and where necessary, an evidentiary hearing."). For the genesis of the
reasonable-basis requirement, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984)
and Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987).
31. Grant, 813 A.2d at 734 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 645 A.2d 189, 198 (Pa.
1994) (and also citing Commonwealth v. Griffin, 515 A.2d 865, 869 (Pa. 1986)).
32. Id. In some cases prior to Grant, however, the court has found that the trial attorney could not possibly have had a reasonable basis for his or her actions and awarded a
new trial without a remand to discover the attorney's reasons. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Costa, 742 A.2d 1076, 1077-78 (Pa. 1999) (counsel could not possibly have had a reasonable
basis for failing to object to a comment on the defendant's constitutional right to remain
silent; a new trial, thus, was awarded without a remand hearing).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 45

extra-record ineffectiveness claims that might possibly exist. 33 In
other words, in any appeal, the appellate attorney has to review
the trial record and develop issues present there. A criminal defense attorney's job under Dancer and Hubbard, however, also
included raising any additional, extra-record claims that were not
presented at trial. Sometimes, the ineffectiveness is completely
recognizable from the record, such as a failure to object to innately
prejudicial testimony. 34 Other times, however, the ineffectiveness
is apparent only after an extra-record investigation is conducted,
such as locating and interviewing witnesses not called during the
trial. 35 The court also said that it was concerned about appellate
attorneys working under tight time constraints and that they
might be hamstrung in fully developing an ineffectiveness issue on
appeal. 36
33.

Grant, 813 A.2d at 736-37. The court said:
appellate counsel must not only scour the existing record for any issues, but
also has the additional burden of raising any extra-record claims that may exist by interviewing the client, family members, and any other people who may
shed light on claims that could have been pursued before or during trial and at
sentencing.
Id. at 737.
34. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 788 A.2d 985, 992 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). In Johnson, the trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the "innately prejudicial" testimony that the defendant had exercised his constitutional right to remain silent. Johnson,
788 A.2d at 992. By its nature, the essence of this claim was apparent from the record. Id.
The court found that the attorney could not possibly have had a reasonable basis for failing
to request a mistrial once the jury heard this inadmissible and prejudicial evidence. Id.
Therefore, a remand hearing was not necessary to discover if counsel might have had a
reasonable basis for failing to request a mistrial. Id. In short, the trial attorney's failure to
object was apparent from the transcript without the need for any additional evidence or
any additional investigation by the appellate attorney.
35. Commonwealth v. Harris, 785 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) ("[We hold that
Appellant's claim is of arguable merit, trial counsel had no reasonable basis or strategy for
his inaction, and Appellant was prejudiced by counsel's failure to call character witnesses.
Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial."), allocatur denied, 847 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 2004).
36. Grant, 813 A.2d at 737. The Grant court said that "[i]mportantly, appellate counsel
must perform this Herculean task in the limited amount of time that is available for filing
an appeal from the judgment of sentence - 30 days." Id. (citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 720). The
thirty-day period to which the court refers concerns the amount of time a defendant has to
file a notice of appeal. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 720(A). The court, however, missed the mark
with this point. The ineffectiveness claim did not need to be identified and developed by
the time the notice of appeal was filed. Instead, the appellant had until the Rule 1925(b)
statement was filed with the trial court. An appellant always had at least fourteen days
from the receipt of the transcript to file the Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v.
Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (the trial court must provide an adequate
period of time to review the transcripts before filing a Rule 1925(b) statement). Because
transcripts typically take some time to prepare, this could add weeks or months to the time
an appellant had to develop the ineffectiveness issues. See Harris et al., supra note 15, at
480 (obtaining the records and transcripts on some cases may take over six months). If
more time would be needed after receipt of the transcripts, the appellant could always ask
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Because of these factors, the Grant court believed that defendants would be better served by waiting until collateral review
where they can more fully develop their claims and create a complete record. "Deferring review of trial counsel ineffectiveness
claims until the collateral review stage of the proceedings offers a
petitioner the best avenue to effect his Sixth Amendment right to
37
counsel."
After discussing the perceived problems with raising ineffectiveness claims on appeal, the court stopped short of banning
them. It said that it was "overrule[ing] Hubbard to the extent
that it requires that trial counsel's ineffectiveness be raised at
that time when a petitioner obtains new counsel or those claims
will be deemed waived." 38 In overruling Hubbard to this extent,
the Grant court seemed to say that ineffectiveness arguments not
raised on direct appeal are not necessarily waived. A criminal
appellant would have the option to raise the ineffectiveness issue
on direct appeal or else raise it later in a post-conviction proceeding if raising it on appeal proved to be ill advised.
This interpretation was reinforced by other language the court
chose in announcing its holding in Grant. The court stated, "[w]e
now hold that, as a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review." 39 Again relying upon the rationale that an ineffectiveness
claim is not waived if not raised on direct appeal, the court wrote
that, "[s]imply stated, a claim raising trial counsel ineffectiveness
will no longer be considered waived because new counsel on direct
appeal did not raise a claim related to prior counsel's ineffectiveness." 40 The majority then added that "It]he purpose of the new
rule [announced in Grant] will be served since defendants will no
longer be compelled to raise ineffectiveness claims on an undeveloped record .... ,,41 Also, the court said that "although the parties
may rely on the old rule of law and raise ineffectiveness claims [on
appeal], neither party will be prejudiced since claims of ineffec-

the trial court for more time. Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 778 (Pa. 2005).
While the court was correct that in some cases this created more work for the appellate
attorney, it was a process that generally worked for a quarter century.
37. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738; but see infra notes 84-85 (offering the opposing view that
the Sixth Amendment is better served by litigating ineffectiveness arguments on direct
appeal).
38. Grant,813 A.2d at 737.
39. Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
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Finally,

the court expressed its belief that neither party "will be harmed by
application of the new rule.. .. "43
In other words, appellants can raise ineffectiveness issues if
they want, but they need not raise them to avoid waiver. Furthermore, the court did not specifically say that ineffectiveness
arguments could not be raised on direct appeal. Justice Castille's
concurrence, in fact, bemoaned this limitation on the court's holding. 44 If some ineffectiveness issues cannot be raised on direct
appeal, then certainly some defendants will be harmed by the
Grant rule.
Lastly, the court hypothesized that the new Grant rule may require some exceptions despite the perceived difficulties with raising ineffectiveness issues on direct appeal. When a defendant has
suffered "a complete or constructive denial of counsel" or when
"counsel has breached his or her duty of loyalty" to the client, the
court suggested that "this court may choose to create an exception
45
to the general rule and review those claims on direct appeal."

42.
43.
44.

Id. (emphasis added).
Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
Id. at 742-43 (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting). According to Justice Castille:
The word "should" does not bar appellants from raising new claims of trial
counsel ineffectiveness on direct appeal: it therefore suggests an aspiration
rather than an actual standard; it invites appellants to try to avoid the "general" rule; and it promises years of further confusion as the contours of the
play in the new rule are litigated.

Id.
45. Id. at 738 n.14 (majority opinion). Justice Castille seems to have recognized why
the court suggested these two possible exceptions to the Grant rule:
[I]n situations where assistance of counsel in fact has been denied entirely or
during a critical stage of the proceeding, or where counsel in fact actively represented conflicting interests, the defendant does not need to demonstrate the
Strickland prejudice that would otherwise be required for a showing of ineffectiveness, i.e., he need not show that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the
proceeding would probably have been different.
Id. at 743 (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162,
166-67 (2002) and Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 287 (2000)). Justice Castille also imagined that allowing for an exception like this will encourage appellants to attempt to argue
their way around Grant. He stated:
The predictable consequence of the majority's dicta is that routine claims of
counsel ineffectiveness will now be accompanied by an exaggerated assertion of
the constructive denial of counsel - i.e., the courts will see claims that counsel's performance in failing to raise an objection was so deficient that it was as
if the defendant were unrepresented - merely in the hope of securing a preview round of collateral attack upon direct appeal.
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The nature and number of any exceptions would wait for another
46
day.
C.

Applying the New Grant Rule: Flexible or Absolute?

Just four months after Grant was decided, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the same issue in Massaro v. United
States.47 There, the Court considered the government's invitation
to hold that ineffectiveness claims could not be brought on direct
appeal in federal court. The Court, in an opinion that cited favorably to Grant,48 said that ineffectiveness arguments not raised
in a direct appeal from a federal criminal conviction were not
waived in a later habeas corpus proceeding. 49 In fact, the Court
specifically noted that ineffectiveness arguments sometimes are
appropriate in a direct appeal and should be raised there. The
Massaro Court stated:
We do not hold that ineffective-assistance claims must be reserved for collateral review. There may be cases in which
trial counsel's ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record
that appellate counsel will consider it advisable to raise the
issue on direct appeal. There may be instances, too, when obvious deficiencies in representation will be addressed by an
50
appellate court sua sponte.
This holding, concerning appellate review of federal convictions
in the federal courts, was not binding on the states, leaving the
Pennsylvania Superior Court with the initial task of applying the
seemingly-equivocal Grant rule. It has struggled with this task.
The vast majority of cases published by the superior court in the
aftermath of Grant did not address any ineffectiveness issues, but
instead punted these claims to the post-conviction stage. 51 The
46. Id. at 738 n.14 (majority opinion) ("[A]s there is no issue raising such a question [of
exceptions] in this case, such a consideration is more appropriately left to another day.").
47. 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
48. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 508 (citing to Grant's language indicating that a claim is not
waived if not raised on direct appeal and saying that "[a] growing majority of state courts
now follow the rule we adopt today.").
49. Id. at 509 ("We do hold that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate
proceeding under § 2255 [which is the federal habeas corpus statute].").
50. Id. at 508.
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 894 A.2d 151, 153-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (dismissing the ineffectiveness claims without prejudice for them to be considered in a postconviction petition); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 874 A.2d 66, 73-74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(same), allocatur denied, 899 A.2d 1122 (Pa. 2006); Commonwealth v. Ramos-Torres, 855
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superior court, however, rightly took the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's equivocal language in Grant at face value to mean that it
was in fact a general rule with some exceptions.
In the superior court's first opportunity to apply Grant, it said
that the supreme court "did not announce a complete prohibition
on consideration of ineffectiveness claims on direct review." 52 Because of this equivocation, the superior court considered the ineffectiveness argument because the defendant had raised the issue
in his Rule 1925(b) statement 53 and the lower court had written
an opinion that addressed the issue, which the superior court
found to be sufficient for appellate review. 54 Approximately six
months later, however, the superior court reached the opposite
result in another case where the issue had been raised in the Rule
1925(b) statement and addressed in the trial court opinion, but no
record had been created specifically dealing with the ineffectiveness issue. 55 Two months after that, the court found that when an
issue is raised in the Rule 1925(b) statement, the trial court addresses the issue in its opinion, and the record is otherwise sufficient (even when a hearing on the ineffectiveness issue was not
held), the claim can be considered on appeal. 56 Instead of creating
a consistent line of cases, the court made distinctions where none
were present.
The superior court found another exception for ineffectiveness
arguments in appeals from juvenile adjudications. 57 A delinquent
juvenile may not resort to the PCRA for relief because it only applies to adults convicted of a crime. 58 Again harkening back to the
A.2d 116, 118-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (same); Commonwealth v. Causey, 833 A.2d 165,
174-76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (same), allocaturdenied, 848 A.2d 927 (Pa. 2004).
52. Commonwealth v. Jette, 818 A.2d 533, 535 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), allocatur
denied, 833 A.2d 141 (Pa. 2003).
53. Again, pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, an appellant must file a
statement that identifies the issues to be raised on appeal. The trial court then writes an
opinion addressing these issues. See supra note 26.
54. Jette, 818 A.2d at 535 n.3. For the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's treatment of this
Grant exception, see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
55. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034, 1037 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). The
Burkett court distinguished Jette by saying that the record in Jette did not specify whether
the ineffectiveness issue had been properly preserved in a post-sentence motion, so the
Burkett court was going to "assume" that the issue in Jette had been properly preserved.
Burkett, 830 A.2d at 1037 n.2. Jette, however, seems to more clearly point to the opposite
conclusion.
56. Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 792-93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
57. In re A.J., 829 A.2d 312, 315 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), allocatur denied, 842 A.2d
405 (Pa. 2003); In re B.S., 831 A.2d 151, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
58. In Interest of A.P., 617 A.2d 764, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (en banc), affd, 639 A.2d
1181 (Pa. 1994) (per curiam).
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indecisive language from Grant, the superior court has allowed
juvenile appellants to argue prior counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal when no other possible way existed to argue that the
59
prior attorney was ineffective.
Finally, the superior court was faced with the conundrum of a
criminal defendant with such a short sentence that he or she will
have finished it before any relief is possible under the PCRA. This
creates a problem because a defendant is eligible for relief under
the PCRA only if he or she is "currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime"6 0 at the time relief
is granted. 6 1 Consequently, for defendants with sentences so
short that their sentence will be completed before a PCRA petition
could be litigated, a strict reading of Grant requiring deferral
would divest these appellants of any opportunity to litigate
whether their trial attorney was ineffective.
The fate of short-sentence defendants, however, did not seem to
be sealed by the open-ended language in Grant. By stating a general rule and by hinting at possible exceptions, 62 the Grant court
did not appear to be creating "ineffectiveness free zones" ' 63 in direct appeals.
Because of PCRA ineligibility for short-sentence defendants, the
superior court created and repeatedly applied a short-sentence
exception to the general deferral rule of Grant.64 Sitting en banc,
the court noted that "the strict application of the rule announced
in Grant is problematic in some instances" such as in cases involv-

59. In re A.J., 829 A.2d at 315 n.3; In re B.S., 831 A.2d at 154.
60. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (1998).
61. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997).
62. See supranotes 18-46 and accompanying text.
63. This term was coined by Professor Bruce A. Antkowiak in Five Hot Topics: Issues of
PendingConcern in Pennsylvania'sAppellate Courts, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 411, 417-18 (2004).
64. See Commonwealth v. Salisbury, 823 A.2d 914, 915-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(ninety-day sentence), disapprovedof by Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005);
Commonwealth v. Ingold, 823 A.2d 917, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (seven-day sentence),
allocatur denied, 832 A.2d 435 (Pa. 2003), disapproved of by O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597; Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d 728, 732 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (ninety-day sentence); Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 587 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (one year of probation served
by the time the appeal was decided), allocatur denied, 863 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2004); but see
Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (declining to apply the
short-sentence exception because the defendant still had almost two years of remaining
probation within which to litigate a PCRA petition), allocatur denied, 848 A.2d 928 (Pa.
2004); Commonwealth v. Blessitt, 852 A.2d 1215, 1218-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (en banc)
(sixteen to thirty-two month sentence stayed while defendant released on bond pending
appeal allowing sufficient time to litigate a post-conviction petition), disapproved of by
O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597.
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ing a short sentence. 65 The first panel to create the short-sentence
exception aptly noted that without this exception, those with a
short sentence cannot enforce their right to effective assistance of
counsel: "Harm is demonstrated by the fact that Appellant will not
be able to challenge his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel because of the length of his sentence." 66 This is what
led one commentator to refer to the short-sentence exception as
67
"the easy exception" to Grant.
While the superior court has struggled to develop a workable
construct after Grant, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has had
no problem in clarifying the paradigm for ineffectiveness issues on
direct appeal. Despite the equivocal language it used in Grant,
the supreme court's decisions following Grant have cemented a
bright-line rule that shifted all undeveloped ineffectiveness arguments to the post-conviction stage.
The post-Grant court has repeatedly reaffirmed its preference
for ineffectiveness issues to be deferred to the post-conviction
stage. 68 The one exception allowed by the court is for ineffectiveness arguments fully litigated in the trial court via a postsentence motion and a hearing. 69 In Commonwealth v. Bomar, the
court found that none of the concerns outlined in Grant - lack of
a hearing, lack of a trial court opinion, distaste for appellate factfinding, inadequate time for counsel to develop issues - were present here where the ineffectiveness issues were developed in a
post-sentence motion, resolved with a hearing and then discussed
in a trial court opinion. 70 No reason existed in Bomar to not consider fully developed ineffectiveness issues.
Though the Bomar exception followed Grant by less than six
months, as of the publication of this article, no other exceptions
have yet been created by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. To
the contrary, Bomar reinforced the necessity of Grant's require65. Blessitt, 852 A.2d at 1219.
66. Salisbury, 823 A.2d at 916.
67. Antkowiak, supra note 63, at 418 (capitalization modified). Professor Antkowiak
wrote that "[w]here direct appeal is the only appeal that is practically possible, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has properly recognized that all issues, including ineffectiveness of
trial counsel, must be permitted." Id. No doubt because this proposition seemed selfevident, he did not elaborate on why the superior court properly created this exception. See
id.
68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 459 (Pa. 2006); Commonwealth
v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351, 356-57 (Pa.2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 139 (2005); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 107-08 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 827 A.2d
1195, 1198-99 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 940 (2004).
69. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
70. Bomar, 826 A.2d at 853-55.
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ments instead of chipping away at Grant's foundations. In fact,
the supreme court has closed two of the openings the superior
court had created to allow ineffectiveness arguments on direct appeal.
In Commonwealth v. Davido,71 the supreme court found that the
mere presence of a trial court opinion addressing the ineffectiveness arguments does not merit an exception to Grant. In Davido,
no record had been created on the ineffectiveness issue, but the
trial court relied exclusively upon the existing record when writing its opinion.72 This was insufficient, and the ineffectiveness
73
claim was, thus, deferred to the post-conviction stage.
In August 2005, in Commonwealth v. O'Berg,74 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court further cemented the deferment mandate of
Grant by disapproving of an exception for those with sentences too
short to ever obtain post-conviction relief. This rule effectively
eliminates the possibility of litigating ineffectiveness arguments
for a class of criminal defendants.
In reaching this result, the court recognized that it said in
Grant that the new rule should not harm a defendant, but the
court nonetheless said "[t]hat concern, however, cannot be used to
defeat the reasoning underlying our decision in Grant."75 The
O'Berg court also chastised the superior court for "focus[ing] on
issues of fairness" and for "ignor[ing] whether the trial court [had]
reviewed the claim," which it categorized as "the critical inquiry"
76
in an ineffectiveness issue.
The supreme court again highlighted that the driving forces behind Grant were the perceived necessity for a lower court opinion,
the need for a record, and the fear of an appellate court acting as a

71. 868 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 660 (2005).
72. Davido, 868 A.2d at 441 n.16.
73. Id. at 441. This overruled the exception created by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Commonwealth v. Jette, 818 A.2d 533, 535 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), allocatur
denied, 833 A.2d 141 (Pa. 2003), and Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 792-93 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003). See Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 877 A.2d 1273, 1274-75 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2005) (recognizing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had tacitly overruled this proce.
dure of relying upon the Rule 1925(b) statement and the trial court opinion to develop an
infectiveness issue for direct appeal), allocatur denied, 891 A.2d 730 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 61 (2006). See supra notes 52-56 (discussing this superior court exception).
74. 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005).
75. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 601. In Grant, the court said that "neither party will be
harmed by application of the new rule since claims of ineffectiveness can be raised in a
collateral proceeding...." Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 739 (Pa. 2002).
76. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 601.
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fact finder; it noted that these concerns would remain in a short77
sentence scenario and "cannot be ignored."
The court also wrote that it was not capable of devising a test to
determine how short a sentence must be to qualify for this exception. 78 Without an appropriate short-sentence test, the court worried that the rule might be applied unfairly to some defendants
while leaving others out. 79 This quest for fairness means that all
short-sentence defendants, rather than just some of them, will
have no forum for vindicating their right to effective assistance of
counsel.
The effect of Grant and its progeny is that all undeveloped ineffectiveness issues must be deferred to the post-conviction stage.
This is true even when there can be no post-conviction stage and
the ineffectiveness issues, thus, are impossible to litigate. Defendants in this situation may have been convicted solely because
their attorney was constitutionally ineffective, yet they can do
nothing about it. The issue then becomes whether this construct
is constitutionally permissible.
D.

Policy and ConstitutionalProblems with the Grant and
O'Berg Rules

As a policy matter, despite the salutary reasons for the Grant
decision given by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, there are
many reasons why the deferment rule is troublesome. Defendants
who suffered with a constitutionally ineffective attorney must wait
much longer now to receive relief. As bad as this is in general, for
an innocent defendant, it means being wrongfully incarcerated for
80
a longer period of time.
Grant also puts some defendants in a position of having to make
a nearly impossible choice. They will have to decide whether to
pursue a direct appeal, or to forgo it, along with any preserved
77. Id. at 601-02.
78. Id. at 602.
79. Id. at 602 n.3.
80. See Harris et al., supra note 15, at 467 ("For the innocent or illegally sentenced
defendant, delays exacerbate the miscarriage of justice.'); Peter Sessions, Swift Justice?:
Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the Federal Habeas Corpus Petitionsof State Prisoners, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1547 (1997) ("Petitioners almost always want a speedy resolution to their claims; in some cases it may mean freedom from their incarceration."); Kirk J.
Henderson, Thanks But No Thanks: State Supreme Courts'Attempts to Remove Themselves
from the FederalHabeas Exhaustion Requirement, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 201, 225 (2000)
("prisoners have an interest in receiving relief as quickly as possible"); Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509, 520 (1982) ('The prisoner's principal interest, of course, is in obtaining speedy
federal relief on his claims.").
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issues, in favor of raising ineffectiveness arguments in a PCRA
petition. 81 Pursuing the direct appeal (without any ineffectiveness
arguments) can mean a delay of months or years before an ineffectiveness argument can be litigated. 82 During this delay, evidence
can be lost or can become stale.8 3 Of course, it also means that an
innocent person may sit in jail for a much longer period than
84
would have been necessary before Grant.
This has led some commentators to argue with much force and
reason that all ineffectiveness issues are more properly resolved
during a direct appeal rather than much later (if raising them
later is even possible) in a post-conviction petition. 85 Other pro81. For example, consider a defendant with an arguable issue preserved for appeal and
a slightly better ineffectiveness issue not preserved for appeal. The defendant would have
to decide whether to pursue the direct appeal and wait months and likely years before filing
a post-conviction petition or, alternatively, whether to withdraw the appeal and pursue a
post-conviction petition with only the ineffectiveness issue. If the defendant chose the
latter course, the arguable, preserved issue would be forfeited, but the ineffectiveness issue
could be raised much sooner. In the pre-Grant construct, the defendant would not be faced
with this Hobson's choice, but instead could raise both issues on appeal. For a similar
analysis, see Eve L. Brensike, StructuralReform in CriminalDefense, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 27) (positing a hypothetical conversation between a
lawyer and client facing this situation). See also Thomas M. Place, Recent Developments in
Postconviction Relief, 74 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 78 (2003) ("If counsel is uncertain whether the
defendant will be eligible for PCRA relief at the conclusion of direct appeal and, moreover,
believes the undeveloped ineffectiveness claims are stronger than the preserved issues,
counsel arguably has an obligation to discuss with the defendant withdrawing the appeal
and pursuing postconviction relief.").
82. In O'Berg, the court noted that some direct appeals have taken four, five, even up to
an unbelievable eleven years to be completed. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 602.
83. Henderson, supra note 80, at 226 ("a retrial may become difficult or impossible if a.
• court grants relief in the distant future because memories fade, witnesses disappear, and
evidence is lost or destroyed"); see also Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at 15) (in the
years for a direct appeal to run its course and before a post-conviction petition may be filed,
"crucial witnesses may have died or disappeared. And even if the witnesses are still available, their memories of relevant events may have deteriorated. Physical evidence may
have disappeared, spoiled, or have been destroyed in the normal course of business.!).
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. The prosecution also has an interest in
litigating the ineffectiveness issues earlier rather than later. Henderson, supra note 80, at
225 ("Both the state and the prisoner have an interest in a quicker ultimate resolution of
the case.!). If a new trial were to be granted, the prosecutor may have a much more difficult time reassembling witnesses and evidence many years in the future. See Brensike,
supra note 81 (manuscript at 16); Henderson, supra note 80, at 226. Also, victims and
families would have to live through another trial when they may have mentally moved on
from the crime. Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at 16). Perhaps this is why, in Commonwealth v. Grant, the Commonwealth and the Attorney General as amicus both favored
the then-existing Dancer/Hubbardrule. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 740
(Pa. 2002) (Saylor, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for the Attorney General of Pennsylvania
as Amicus Curiae supporting respondents at 2)); see also infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
85. Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at 29-31). Professor Brensike argues that a
modified direct appeal procedure would allow for ineffectiveness issues to be raised on
direct appeal. Her suggested procedure calls for the appellate attorney to file with the trial
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ponents of this view were the strange bedfellows of the parties in
Grant and the Pennsylvania Attorney General participating as
amicus. None of them wanted the change wrought by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Grant.8 6 In its brief, the Attorney
General put it this way:
Any alternative procedures [other than the Dancer/Hubbard
rule] would delay finality where affirmance of the judgment of
sentence is the correct result, would delay the grant of relief
where relief is the correct result, and would delay the convening of evidentiary hearings where there is a need to complete
a factual record. Any alternative procedures would benefit
neither the Commonwealth, the defendant nor the effective
87
administration of justice.
Putting aside these strong policy arguments against the Grant
approach, Grant's deferment procedure is not per se unconstitutional.8 8 Though having to wait, defendants are directed to another forum where they may raise their arguments about whether
their attorney's performance met the constitutional standard.
While the Grant approach arguably is not the best construct for
appellate practice, that does not make it unconstitutional.
The Constitution, however, comes into play when no alternative
forum is available to litigate an ineffectiveness claim. Defendants
with a sentence so short that it does not allow them the time necessary to litigate a post-conviction petition are left with no opportunity to vindicate their right to effective assistance of counsel.
The issue then becomes whether a state is required to present a
court a motion for a new trial when any ineffectiveness issues are present. The time for
filing this motion would be at least six months after the trial transcripts are prepared,
which would allow sufficient time for extra-record investigation. The trial court then would
rule on this motion, and the appeal, if still necessary, would proceed to the appellate court.
Any preserved issues would be considered with the ineffectiveness issues. Id. This procedure would satisfy the four difficulties that led to the Grant decision, i.e., the appellate
court would not be ruling on an issue raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court
would not have to consider matters outside of the record or act as a fact finder, the trial
court will have supplied the appellate court with an opinion, and appellate counsel will
have had a reasonable amount of time to investigate and prepare the argument. See Grant,
813 A.2d at 734, 736-37; see also supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text (discussing this
portion of Grant).
86. "[N]either party to this appeal advocates departure from present practice. Further,
the view of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, acting as amicus curiae, aligns with that
of the parties ....
Grant, 813 A.2d at 740 (Saylor, J., concurring).
87. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for the Attorney General of Pennsylvania
as Amicus Curiaesupporting respondents at 2).
88. See generally Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (preferring, though not
absolutely requiring, deferment of ineffectiveness claims).
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criminal defendant with a forum to enforce the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel.
In his concurrence in O'Berg, Justice Castille opined that states
are not required to provide this opportunity to a defendant with a
short sentence. He wrote that "in drafting the PCRA, the General
Assembly made a presumptively valid legislative judgment that
direct review provides sufficient due process for relatively minor
infractions, no matter how grave a defaulted constitutional violation may have occurred."8 9 Justice Castille added that he believed
a state may lessen its courts' caseloads and the concomitant costs
by depriving those with a short sentence of the opportunity to vindicate their right to counsel: "In a world of overburdened courts
and overtaxed governmental coffers, it is perfectly rational to deny
habeas corpus/collateral claim review to petitioners whose 'bodies'
the state no longer 'has' - even if it means they lose the chance to
raise any and all complaints they may have about their trial lawyers." 90 Justice Castille believes that "[t]here is nothing unreasonable, unwise, or unconstitutional with such a construct." 91
Federal constitutional law, however, suggests that Justice Castille's pronouncement is incorrect. Whether or not depriving defendants of the opportunity to vindicate their right to counsel is
reasonable or wise, it is unconstitutional.
Despite the O'Berg ruling, that case was not the final word on a
short-sentence exception to Grant. The O'Berg court, while failing
to create a short-sentence exception, did so on state-law grounds,
merely declining to change the general holding of a precedent. 92 It

89. Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 603 (Pa. 2005) (Castille, J., concurring).
He continued by saying that:
[tihe General Assembly must have foreseen that, because of the minor nature
of some crimes or the brevity of some sentences, certain defendants would not
be entitled to seek collateral review at all. The General Assembly also must
have foreseen that its custody or control restriction would effectively preclude
"short sentence" defendants from pursuing collateral claims, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel.
O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 603. Justice Castille failed to note, however, that when the Legislature
created the PCRA and its predecessor, ineffectiveness claims could have been raised on
direct appeal. Under the construct the Legislature created at the time, all defendants had
an opportunity to litigate Sixth Amendment violations.
90. Id. at 604. Justice Castille's concerns for the "overburdened courts and overtaxed
governmental coffers" is contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Pennsylvania constitutional right to appeal. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 607. (Saylor, J., dissenting). This was Justice Saylor's take on the majority
O'Berg opinion. Id. (Because the O'Berg court considered neither the federal due process
clause nor the state right to appeal, that case "represents a more straightforward, error-
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did not consider the role of the federal constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process. 9 3 The court also did not consider the
impact of the state constitutional right to an appeal. 94 Viewed
through these lenses, the O'Berg decision is wrong. Pennsylvania
must allow an outlet for defendants with short sentences to argue
that they were deprived of their constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, WHICH IS A DEFENDANT'S MOST IMPORTANT RIGHT AND
WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO A FAIR TRIAL
The starting point in examining the necessity for a shortsentence exception is recognizing why the right to counsel is the
keystone right enjoyed by a criminal defendant and why a defendant, thus, must be given an opportunity to vindicate the deprivation of that right. The reason that a defendant must be afforded a
forum to litigate ineffectiveness issues is because the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution 95 and by article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 96 is the most important right that a criminal defendant
enjoys. The United States Supreme Court recognized that "[o]f all
the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented
by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to
assert any other rights he may have."97 The Court has repeated
98
this bedrock principle many times over the past four decades.
review case in which some of the most problematic aspects of the application of Grant in
the short-sentence paradigm lie beyond the available scope of our review.").
93. Id. at 599 n.2 (Because O'Berg first raised a due process argument in his reply brief
to the supreme court, that issue was waived and, thus, not considered by the court.).
94. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 607 (Saylor, J., dissenting) ("perhaps it can be said that any
claim under Article V, Section 9's guarantee of the right to a direct appeal is also waived
here, since Appellant does not specifically invoke that constitutional provision.").
95. In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
96. The pertinent portion of article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that "[iun all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself
and his counsel." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
97. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer,
Federalismand State Criminal Procedure,70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
98. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (the Court has categorized the
criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel as "the most fundamental of all freedoms.'); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978) ("In an adversary system of criminal
justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel.");
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (the right to counsel is a fundamental
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The right to an attorney is so important because "[w]ithout
counsel, the right to a trial itself would be 'of little avail."' 99 Ultimately, what is at stake with the right to counsel is a defendant's
right to a fair trial.100 More than just requiring that the accused
has secured a warm body in possession of a law license, the right
to counsel encompasses effective representation throughout the
case. 101

In numerous cases, the Court has made clear that a fair trial
likely will not occur if counsel is ineffective. "Unless the accused
receives the effective assistance of counsel, 'a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself."' 102 Likewise, the absence of effective
counsel undermines "the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." 10 3 In other words, confidence
that the defendant has received a fair trial and been rightly con104
victed evaporates when counsel is ineffective.
The importance of the right to counsel was eloquently set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Powell v. Alabama10 5 nearly three-quarters of a century ago:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is inright which "assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process." (citing
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344)); see also Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an EndangeredRight?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 36 (1991) ('The Sixth Amendment
occupies a pivotal role in the panoply of rights accorded criminal defendants through the
Bill of Rights. This distinction flows from the amendment's prescriptive, symbolic and
practical value to the adversary system of adjudication. The amendment fosters and promotes the functional and normative purpose of affording a criminal defendant a fair trial."
(footnotes omitted)).
99. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 653 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
100. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). ("the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial").
101. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 ('CThat a person who happens to be a lawyer is present
at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command."); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
102. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980)).
103. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ('The system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance
the public interest in truth and fairness.").
104. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 ("the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to
receive a fair trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 ('The Sixth Amendment recognizes the
right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical
to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.").
105. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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capable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or
criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to
hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him,
it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be
a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the
10 6
constitutional sense.
A defendant must be given some way to enforce this critical
right, the right by which the adversary system measures whether
a trial is fair. Over two centuries ago in Marbury v. Madison, the
United States Supreme Court made clear that a remedy must be
available when a right has been violated; "where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." 107 This means that a criminal defendant must be provided with a forum to demonstrate that his or her
trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial, thus, was fundamentally unfair.
IV. THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES ALL
DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL REGARDLESS OF THE
SENTENCE OR THE CHARGES

In Pennsylvania, a criminal defendant enjoys the state constitutional right to an appeal through article V, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Under article V, section 9, "there shall be a
right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative
agency to a court of record or to an appellate court." 108 This is an
106.
107.
108.

Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
PA. CONST. art. V, § 9.
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"absolute right" 10 9 that extends to "[e]very person convicted
of a
crime."1 1 0 Furthermore, the guarantee of this constitutional right
"is now settled beyond argument." ''
When article V, section 9 was being drafted and debated during
the Constitutional Convention of 1968, the Framers were concerned that some aggrieved litigants were being deprived of an
opportunity to have a court on appeal decide their case on the
merits. 112 Because they believed the right to appeal was fundamental, the Framers were unconcerned about what effect this
newly-guaranteed right might have on the caseloads of the Commonwealth's appellate courts.1 1 3 The final result, which passed by
a vote of 128 to 2, was that the Framers intended to guarantee to
all the right of appeal that could not be limited by legislative action or judicial decision.1 4 One commentator has stated:
It is clear from the plain language of the provision, the related
historical background, and the debates at the Constitutional
Convention of 1968 that the Framers intended to provide a
fundamental right of review on the merits to every litigant in
Pennsylvania. This right could not be limited or interfered
with by the legislature or the courts .... 115
The rule in O'Berg deprives defendants who received a short
sentence and who want to argue the ineffectiveness of their trial
counsel of any opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to
appeal. Article V, section 9, however, was intended to prevent
such judicial encroachment upon the right to appeal. 1 6

109. Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (Pa. 1980) (citing PA. CONST. art.
V, § 9).
110. Commonwealth v. Maloy, 264 A.2d 697, 698 (Pa. 1970).
111. Maloy, 264 A.2d at 698. Numerous cases from the superior court also have discussed the right to appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bronaugh, 670 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) ("In Pennsylvania, an accused has an absolute right to a direct appeal."
(citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 9)); Commonwealth v. McKnight, 457 A.2d 1272, 1275 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983) ("an accused has an absolute right to an appeal" (citing PA. CONST. art. V,
§ 9)).
112. Leonard Sosnov, Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Pennsylvania Constitution:
Examining the Present and Exploring the Future, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 217, 329-32 (1993).
113. Id. at 332.
114. Id. at 332-33 and n.547.
115. Id. at 332 (footnote omitted).
116. See also Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 781 (Pa. 2005) (Saylor, J., dissenting) ("I believe that reflexive displacement of appeals, in whole or in part, based on
factors outside the litigants' direct control is in substantial tension with the right to direct
appellate review conferred by the Pennsylvania Constitution." (citing PA. CONST. art. V, §
9)).
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Some means of appeal must be afforded to those criminal defendants with short sentences to argue that they were deprived of
effective assistance of counsel at trial. For short-sentence defendants to be able to realize their constitutional right to appeal, either they must be allowed to raise ineffectiveness issues on direct
appeal or they must be permitted to raise them under the PCRA,
even if they already have completed their sentences.
V. ONCE THE RIGHT TO AN APPEAL HAS BEEN GRANTED, IT MUST
BE CONDUCTED CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS, WHICH MEANS
THAT IT MUST BE A MEANINGFUL APPEAL THAT PROVIDES AN
ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE THE ISSUES

During the course of the twentieth century and continuing today, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a
state's appellate process must be administered in accord with due
process principles. This line of cases leads to the conclusion that a
state, consistent with due process, may not eliminate the right of a
class of criminal defendants to raise a claim that they were deprived of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
At the close of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court held that a state is not required to provide an appeal
to a criminal conviction. 117 This remains the law today, 118 though
its vitality has been questioned. 119 Even though an appeal is not
constitutionally mandated, however, the Court has said that once
an appeal is offered (as the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees
in article V, section 9), the state is restricted in efforts to limit an
appeal.
In Griffin v. Illinois,120 the Court tackled the question of
whether a state may condition an appeal upon the purchase of a
117. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
118. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582, 2586 (2005).
119. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). There,
Justice Brennan stated:
[i]f the question were to come before us in a proper case, I have little doubt that
• . . we would decide that a State must afford at least some opportunity for review of convictions, whether through the familiar mechanism of appeal or
through some form of collateral proceeding. There are few, if any, situations in
our system of justice in which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion
over matters concerning a person's liberty or property, and the reversal rate of
criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state courts, while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of
their right to appeal would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous
conviction.
Jones, 463 U.S. at 756 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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transcript that an indigent defendant cannot afford. The Court
noted that "[a]ll of the States now provide some method of appeal
from criminal convictions, recognizing the importance of appellate
review to a correct adjudication of guilt or innocence."' 121 The
Court also recognized that appellate review in Illinois (as in Pennsylvania under article V, section 9) was "an integral part of the
[state] trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence
of a defendant."'122 Relying primarily upon equal protection
grounds, the Griffin Court held that access to an appeal cannot be
23
conditioned upon a defendant's ability to pay some cost. 1
In addition to these equal protection concerns, however, the
Court noted that the transcript is necessary to ensure an "adequate and effective" appeal. 124 In other words, the Court was not
concerned just with the disparity in rich versus poor defendants,
but also with ensuring that the defendant had the capacity to
make this appeal "adequate and effective." In this sense, the Due
Process Clause was also important to this decision's principle. 125
Seven years later, on the same day the Court decided Gideon v.
127
Wainwright,126 it issued its opinion in Douglas v. California.
The Court held that a state may not deprive an indigent defen8
dant of the assistance of counsel in a first appeal as of right.12
121. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
122. Id. Not only is the right to appeal recognized in the Pennsylvania Constitution, but
it also can be found in the Rules of Appellate Procedure, PA. R. APP. P. 341 ("an appeal may
be taken as of right from any final order of an administrative agency or lower court"), in the
Judicial Code, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5105(a)(1) ("Right to appellate review: There is a right
of appeal under this subsection from the final order (including an order defined as a final
order by general rule) of every: . . .Court or magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth to the court having jurisdiction of such appeals."), and, in case law, as noted above
in notes 109-11 and accompanying text. To borrow Griffin's language, Pennsylvania, thus,
has "recognize[ed] the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication of guilt or
innocence" and has made it an "integral part" of the scheme that determines guilt or innocence. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
123. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
124. Id. at 20.
125. The Court observed that the issue presented to it argued a denial of due process as
well as equal protection. Id. at 13. The Court also noted that "our own constitutional
guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials
which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of persons."
Id. at 17.
126. 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (in Gideon, the Court held that an indigent defendant
in a state-court criminal prosecution has the right to have counsel appointed to represent
him or her).
127. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
128. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358. The procedure being reviewed in Douglas involved an
appraisal of the record by an appellate court to determine whether appointment of counsel
"would be helpful to the defendant or the court." If the court believed not, it should not
appoint counsel for the appeal. Id. at 354-55.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 45

Again, the primary impetus for this decision was an equal protection concern, but due process notions also provided support for the
holding.129 In that vein, the Court noted that an unrepresented
indigent's appeal would be nothing more than a "meaningless ritual."'130 Furthermore, "the right to appeal [without the appointment of counsel to indigents] does not comport with fair procedure."'131 These sentiments reflect concerns that appeals must be
conducted consistent with the Due Process Clause.
The Court declined to extend the reach of Douglas to discretionary appeals to state supreme courts in Ross v. Moffitt.1 32 As noted
above, the Court in Griffin characterized the appeal as being a
continuation of the adjudication of guilt or innocence. 133 The Ross
Court, however, focused upon what it perceived to be "significant
differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal
proceeding."' 1 34 The Court said, "[t]he purpose of the trial stage
129. See id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the Court appears to rely both on the
Equal Protection Clause and on the guarantees of fair procedure inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with obvious emphasis on 'equal protection"').
The United States Supreme Court has noted that a precise rationale for Griffin, Douglas,
and their progeny has not been explicitly stated: "A 'precise rationale' has not been composed . . . because cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis."' M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 608 (1974) and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983)). The Court, however, has often commented upon how due process concepts underpinned both Griffin and
Douglas. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 608-09 ('The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas
lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of
that Amendment."); Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665 ("Due process and equal protection principles
converge in the Court's analysis in these cases"); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756-57
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In recognizing the right to counsel on appeal, we have
expressly relied not only on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause, which in
this context prohibits disadvantaging indigent defendants in comparison to those who can
afford to hire counsel themselves, but also on its Due Process Clause and its incorporation
of Sixth Amendment standards.'); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 n.12 (1985) (after
noting that the Court in Ross analyzed the issue primarily in terms of equal protection, the
Court pointed out that "neither Ross nor any of the other cases in the Griffin line ever
rejected the proposition that the Due Process Clause exerted a significant influence on our
analysis in this area."); M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110 ("the Griffin plurality drew support from
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses").
130. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358. See Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at 44). Professor Brensike notes that, interestingly, the Court realized that the appeal for an unrepresented indigent may be a "meaningless ritual" "where the record is unclear or the errors are
hidden." Id. (quoting Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358). This begs the question of what errors
could be unclear or hidden except ineffectiveness issues. If the attorney has objected and
preserved the issue for appeal, it is neither unclear nor hidden; to the contrary, it is an
obvious potential appellate issue. This language from Douglas, thus, seems to suggest that
ineffectiveness issues may sometimes be necessary for a meaningful appeal.
131. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357.
132. 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
133. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
134. Ross, 417 U.S. at 610.
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from the State's point of view is to convert a criminal defendant
from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." 135 On the other hand, "[b]y contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State's
prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by a
judge or a jury below."' 136 This difference, however, should not affect the question of whether a state may bar a defendant from ever
seeking to vindicate his right to constitutionally effective trial
counsel.
The Ross Court restated the critical importance of trial counsel:
"[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him."'137 It is this quest for a fair trial ensured by counsel that is at stake for short-sentence defendants.
This is not inconsistent with the holding in Ross that counsel is
not constitutionally required to file discretionary appeals to a supreme court. What was central to the holding in Ross was that
the defendant had already been given one counseled appeal as of
right to the intermediate appellate court. 138 A short-sentence defendant with an ineffectiveness issue, on the other hand, is prohibited from ever having a court review his or her only issue, which
sets forth how the trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective.
Though limiting the right to counsel to a first appeal as of right,
the Ross Court still recognized the importance of access to that
appeal: "[t]he duty of the State under our cases is... to assure the
indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims
fairly in the context of the State's appellate process."'139 Due process principles therefore entitle short-sentence defendants to an
opportunity to present ineffectiveness claims to an appellate court.
In Evitts v. Lucey,140 the United States Supreme Court extended
Douglas's right to counsel on appeal for indigents to the right for
all defendants to enjoy constitutionally effective counsel on appeal.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
138. Id. at 615 ("At that stage [of discretionary supreme court review], he will have, at
the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the
Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the
Court of Appeals disposing of his case.").
139. Ross, 417 U.S. at 616 (emphasis added).
140. 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).
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In reaching this decision, the Court explicitly held that appeals
must be conducted under the auspices of the Due Process Clause.
"In short, when a State opts to act in a field where its action has
significant discretionary elements [such as deciding direct appeals], it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the
Constitution - and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process
Clause."'141 Specifically, the Due Process Clause requires a state
that has provided an appeal of a conviction "to offer each defendant a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits of
142
his appeal."'
The Court later reaffirmed the requirements that the state must
afford a defendant with the opportunity to present his or her
claims on appeal and those claims must be decided on their merits. In Ake v. Oklahoma,143 the Court held that "fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to 'an adequate opportunity to
present their claims fairly within the adversary system."' 144 More
recently, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that a state's procedure must 'affor[d] adequate and effective appellate review to
indigent defendants' . . . [and] [a] State's procedure provides such
review so long as it reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal
will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that ap45
peal."1
If all of these cases were charted on a Venn diagram, the intersecting areas would show that once a state offers an appeal, it
must conduct that appeal consistent with due process. This
means that the state must provide a meaningful appeal, one with
an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues in the appeal to at
least one appellate court. For a criminal defendant with a short
sentence, that means that the due process rights that have attached to the defendant's constitutional right to appeal also protect the right to have any ineffectiveness issues decided on the
merits by an appellate court. The rule in O'Berg in conjunction
with the currently serving requirement of the PCRA cannot defeat
this constitutional right.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
12, 20

Evitts, 469 U.S. at 401.
Id. at 405.
470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 612).
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276-77 (2000) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
(1956)).
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VI. DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES APPLY ON APPEAL TO ALL
DEFENDANTS, REGARDLESS OF THE LENGTH OF THEIR SENTENCES
AND WHETHER THEY ARE CHARGED WITH MISDEMEANORS OR
FELONIES

In his O'Berg concurrence, which no other member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court joined, Justice Castille wrote that "[w]ith
respect to 'short-sentence' cases, in drafting the PCRA, the General Assembly made a presumptively valid legislative judgment
that direct review provides sufficient due process for relatively
minor infractions, no matter how grave a defaulted constitutional
violation may have occurred." 146 This analysis, however, is insensitive to the constitutional due process principles outlined above.
Contrary to Justice Castille's claim, these due process concerns do
not evaporate in cases in which the sentence is short or calls for no
jail time at all.
In Mayer v. Chicago,147 the United States Supreme Court ruled
that an indigent who received no jail sentence was still entitled to
a free transcript. The Court recognized that incarceration is not
the touchstone by which a right to a meaningful appeal is measured. 148 The Mayer Court stated:
The practical effects of conviction of even petty offenses of the
kind involved here are not to be minimized. A fine may bear
as heavily on an indigent accused as forced confinement. The
collateral consequences of conviction may be even more serious, as when (as was apparently a possibility in this case) the
impecunious medical student finds himself barred from the
practice of medicine because of a conviction he is unable to
49
appeal for lack of funds. 1
As this case flows from the Griffin line of cases, due process
along with equal protection considerations prohibit the state from
refusing a transcript even when no jail time is imposed; otherwise,
the defendant is deprived of an appeal.

146. Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 603 (Pa. 2005) (Castille, J., concurring).
147. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
148. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197.
149. Id. The Court also pointed out that states run the risk of alienating its citizenry by
denying them access to appellate courts. Id. "Arbitrary denial of appellate review of proceedings of the State's lowest trial courts may save the State some dollars and cents, but
only at the substantial risk of generating frustration and hostility toward its courts among
the most numerous consumers of justice." Id. at 197-98.
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In his concurrence in Argersinger v. Hamlin,150 Justice Powell
pointed out that "[s]erious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment."' 1 51 He listed some of
the consequences of a conviction irrespective of jail time: loss of a
driver's license, forfeiture of public office, disqualification for a
licensed profession, and a loss of pension benefits. 152 Furthermore, in Evitts v. Lucey, the Court went so far as to say that "some
collateral consequences of his conviction remain" because "he had
153
not been pardoned."'
With this history, the Court, not surprisingly, held in an opinion
by Justice Scalia in Spencer v. Kemna that "it is an 'obvious fact of
life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences."' 154 Along these lines, the Court noted
that "[i]n recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a
wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences (or, what is effectively the same, to count collateral consequences that are remote and unlikely to occur)."'155
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court noted in M.L.B. v.
S.L.J.156 that it "declined to limit Griffin to cases in which the defendant faced incarceration." 157 The M.L.B. Court also recounted
what it said in Mayer that "[p]etty offenses could entail serious
collateral consequences."' 158 Drawing upon these principles, the
Court in M.L.B. extended Griffin to prevent a state from blocking
appellate review of a finding terminating parental rights to one
unable to pay appellate costs.159 This is significant for any criminal defendant with a short sentence, including one with no jail
time at all, because, obviously, no jail time was involved in the
M.L.B. case. Instead, what was important was that the mother
150. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
151. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 48 n.ll.
153. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n.4 (1985).
154. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12 (1998) (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
55 (1968)). The holding in Spencer reaffirmed that presumed collateral consequences of a
conviction, even if the sentence has been served, provide enough of a continuing injury to
maintain a federal habeas corpus action. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-12.
155. Id. at 8 (citing Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55-56); see also Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624,
634 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the United States Supreme Court "has
consistently refused to canvass state law to ascertain 'the actual existence of specific collateral consequences,' and has presumed that such consequences exist" (quoting Sibron, 392
U.S. at 55)).
156. 519 U.S. 102, 112 (1996).
157. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 112.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 128.
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had an opportunity on appeal to challenge the sufficiency of the
lower court's termination of her parental rights. Following this
principle, all short-sentence defendants should also have an opportunity on appeal to argue that the trial attorney was ineffective.
In addition to the Court's recognition that constitutional protections continue to apply in short-sentence cases, the Court also has
frowned upon rules that prevent a criminal defendant from exercising a constitutional right because of the minor nature of the
charges. In Groppi v. Wisconsin, 160 the defendant was charged
with the misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest. In a case that
received a great deal of local media attention (the defendant was a
Roman Catholic priest involved in a protest), the trial court ruled
that Wisconsin law forbade a change of venue for misdemeanor
prosecutions. 16 1 As the Court said, "[t]he question before us,
therefore, goes to the constitutionality of a state law that categorically prevents a change of venue for a criminal jury trial, regardless of the extent of local prejudice against the defendant, on the
sole ground that the charge against him is labeled a misdemeanor."' 162 The Constitution, of course, includes a right to a fair
63
trial by an impartial jury. 1
That right does not evaporate merely because the defendant is
faced with a less serious charge that carries a possibility of little
or no jail time. The Court held that the Constitution requires that
a defendant must be given the opportunity to argue this issue and
a rule that categorically denies that right to one charged with a
misdemeanor was unconstitutional. 164 As Justice Blackmun said
in his concurrence, "unfairness anywhere, in small cases as well as
in large, is abhorred, is to be ferreted out, and is to be elimi65
nated."1
The O'Berg rule wholly denies to one with a short sentence the
opportunity to show that he or she was deprived of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. The holding in
Groppi, though involving a different constitutional right, still

160.
161.

400 U.S. 505 (1971).
Groppi, 400 U.S. at 506.

162. Id. at 507-08.
163. Id. at 509-10.
164. Id. at 511 ("[U]nder the Constitution a defendant must be given an opportunity to
show that a change of venue is required in his case. The Wisconsin statute wholly denied
that opportunity to the appellant [accused of a misdemeanor].").
165. Id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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should control the comparable situation of a defendant with a
short sentence who suffered ineffective assistance of counsel.
In sum, several principles from these cases apply to the shortsentence defendant. First, the lack of a current sentence of supervision (incarceration, probation, or parole) does not mean that the
defendant is unharmed by the conviction. As a matter of federal
constitutional law, collateral consequences are presumed to follow
a criminal conviction. Second, because of these lingering consequences, a defendant maintains his or her due process rights to
have a meaningful appeal that offers an adequate opportunity to
litigate the issues. Third, constitutional rights apply to misdemeanants as well as felons and do not disappear when a person is
charged with a less serious crime. Therefore, the fact that a defendant has received a short sentence does not extinguish the defendant's constitutional rights in his or her appeal to argue trial
counsel's ineffectiveness.
The net result of the United States Supreme Court's case law is
that a defendant has a constitutional right to argue that his or her
trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective. This is true for all
defendants, those with long sentences as well as those with short
sentences. Grant, O'Berg, and the Post-Conviction Relief Act are
unconstitutional to the extent that they deprive any defendant of
this constitutional right to argue trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
The question then remains about how this right can be restored to
short-sentence defendants in Pennsylvania.

VII. WAYS THAT SHORT-SENTENCE DEFENDANTS COULD RAISE
INEFFECTIVENESS ISSUES
Because a state cannot eliminate all opportunity for a defendant
to vindicate the right to effective assistance of counsel, the effect of
O'Berg and the PCRA's currently serving requirement is to create
an unconstitutional condition in which short-sentence defendants
are deprived of their constitutional right to adjudicate ineffectiveness issues. To rectify this situation and to allow these defendants to pursue these constitutional claims, Pennsylvania has
several options.
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Allow, but Not Require, Ineffectiveness Claims to Be Raised on
Direct Appeal

First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can reverse the strict
course mapped out by the cases following Grant and return to the
more permissive language in Grant.1 66 It could revisit the language from Grant that announced a "general rule" that a defendant "should wait" until the collateral stage to raise ineffectiveness claims. 16 7 Because Grant overruled Hubbard "to the extent
that it requires that trial counsel's ineffectiveness be raised" at
the first available opportunity, the court could find that Grant
only means that ineffectiveness claims can be - but need not be
- raised on direct appeal. This is consistent, at least in the broad
sense, with federal practice after Massaro v. United States in
2003.168
This would give the defendant the option of raising an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal or waiting for the post-conviction
stage. For gaps in the record, the appellate court could remand to
the lower court for a hearing when the defendant has presented
an issue with arguable merit and demonstrated that he or she has
been prejudiced. This was the Dancer/Hubbard solution that
worked well for three decades. 69 Justice Saylor suggested that
this procedure eliminated all of the problems identified by the

166. To do this, the court would not necessarily have to say that O'Berg was wrongly
decided. Instead, it could rule on the constitutional grounds that were not presented in
O'Berg. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
167. Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002).
168. 538 U.S. 500 (2003); see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
169. See supranotes 8-13 and accompanying text (discussing Dancer and Hubbard).
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Several other jurisdictions still employ this

approach. 171
This procedure, still familiar to judges and attorneys, would
solve the constitutional conundrum caused by O'Berg. Clearly,
however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not favor a return
to this construct. Bomar, Davido, O'Berg, and the rest of the supreme court's Grant line of cases make this clear. Other possibilities exist that still would preserve the basic deferral scheme of
Grant while still allowing short-sentence defendants to raise ineffectiveness issues.
B.

Allow a Short-Sentence Exception to Grant

Second, the court could, as a constitutional matter, create a
short-sentence exception to Grant. Under this framework, a defendant with a long sentence who would have the time to litigate
ineffectiveness issues in a post-conviction proceeding would be
forced to defer the claims until then. Defendants with a sentence
too short for this would be given the option to raise their ineffectiveness issues on direct appeal. If the court determined that the
issue was one with arguable merit, but more evidence was necessary to determine whether counsel had a reasonable basis or
whether the defendant had been prejudiced, the case could be remanded to the trial court for a hearing. In other words, for those
defendants with a short sentence, the procedure would return to
the pre-Grantregimen.
The problem with this approach is determining how short a sentence must be to allow a defendant to proceed with the ineffective170.

Grant, 813 A.2d at 739-40 (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Saylor said it this way:
When properly implemented, the remand procedure ameliorates most of the
difficulties that the majority associates with the Hubbard rule: the tension between the rule against raising matters for the first time on direct appeal and
the requirement that claims of ineffective assistance must be raised at the first
available opportunity is lessened, since the matter can be returned to the common pleas court for disposition in the first instance; the specter of the appellate
court engaging in factfinding is removed; and the remand will generally put the
matter back before the trial judge, who, as the majority observes, is in the best
position to review the ineffectiveness claims in the first instance. The concern
regarding providing substitute counsel on direct appeal with sufficient time to
fully and fairly complete the necessary review of potential claims could be addressed through procedures more modest than a revamping of the review process, and potentially foreclosing the vindication of substantive rights at the earliest opportunity.

Id.
171. See Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at 32 and n.128) (listing, for example, the
District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming).
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ness issue on direct appeal. This was a major reason for the
72
O'Berg majority to reject the short-sentence exception. 1
Prior to O'Berg, the superior court found sentences ranging from
seven days to one year to be sufficiently short to allow an exception. 173 It also found that a sentence with less than nineteen
months remaining to be served provided sufficient time to litigate
74
a post-conviction petition without the need for an exception. 1
As the O'Berg court feared, a definition of a "short sentence" appropriate for all defendants is virtually impossible to devise. This
is because of the wide variance in the amount of time it takes to
litigate a direct appeal and a post-conviction petition. As the
O'Berg majority noted, direct appeals have taken up to eleven
years to complete. 175 Designating eleven years to be a "short sentence" would make that definition meaningless. A very large percentage of all cases would be "short sentences."
Perhaps an even greater concern, however, is the length of time
that it takes to litigate a post-conviction petition in Pennsylvania.
This is a problem because the defendant must be serving a sentence of incarceration, probation, or parole at the time of the final
adjudication of the proceeding. 176 If the defendant is not serving a
sentence at that time, no relief may be granted. 177 In other words,
before expiration of the sentence, the defendant must have had
172. Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 602 (Pa. 2005) ("the concept of a 'short
sentence' exception is too ambiguous to give the lower courts any guidance on what is a
sufficiently 'short sentence' to apply the exception").
173. See supra note 64 (listing all of the reported cases).
174. Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 866 A.2d 423, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (Popovich, J.,
concurring and dissenting), allocaturgranted, 878 A.2d 863 (Pa. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), allocaturdenied, 848 A.2d 928 (Pa.
2004) (two years of remaining sentence was sufficient).
175. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 602 (citing Commonwealth v. Douglas, 645 A.2d 226, 226 (Pa.
1994) (direct appeal lasting more than 11 years); Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 688 A.2d
1143 (Pa. 1993) (direct appeal lasting at least 5 years); Commonwealth v. McMullen, 681
A.2d 717 (Pa. 1996) (same)). These cases cited by the O'Berg court are just some of the
reported cases from the supreme court. With the large number of unreported cases in
Pennsylvania, the exact dimensions of this problem are unknown. See also Brensike, supra
note 81 (manuscript at 13) (chronicling this problem); Brook Dooley, Thirty-FirstAnnual
Review of Criminal Procedure: Speedy Trials, 90 Geo. L.J. 1454, 1477 n.1158 (2002) (collecting cases involving delays in appeals ranging from two to thirteen years in length).
176. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (1998). That portion of the PCRA says that "[t]o
be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following: (1) [t]hat the petitioner has been convicted
of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is: (i) currently serving a sentence of
imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1)(i).
177. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997) ('To be eligible for relief a
petitioner must be currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole. To
grant relief at a time when appellant is not currently serving such a sentence would be to
ignore the language of the [PCRA] statute.").

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 45

the opportunity to conduct proceedings in the trial court and, if
necessary, on appeal, potentially all the way to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. This process often will be measured in years, not
months.
In a 2003 groundbreaking study,178 the time to litigate a PCRA
petition in Pennsylvania's trial courts (excluding the additional
time required to litigate any appeals from lower court rulings) was
often more than two years. 179 One out of three post-conviction
cases statewide was pending in the trial court more than one year,
and one out of five cases was pending more than two years. 180 The
analysis revealed that "[a]cross Pennsylvania, it is not unusual to
find PCRA cases that have been pending for two, three, or even
four years."'181 In the wake of Grant, the superior court declined to
apply its short-sentence exception to one case with just over eighteen months of remaining sentence 8 2 and to another case with two
years of remaining sentence in which to litigate a post-conviction
petition. 8 3 Given these findings on post-conviction delay, those
decisions were incorrect because those defendants easily may not
have had sufficient time to litigate a post-conviction petition.
Assuming that a defendant is denied post-conviction relief in the
trial court, 18 he or she then would have to appeal the case, which
18 5
the O'Berg court noted sometimes can take five years or more.
If at any point during this process the defendant has finished serving the sentence, the petition must be dismissed. 8 6 Therefore,
any solution must account for this long delay that can prevent
short-sentence defendants from obtaining relief.
Prior to O'Berg, the superior court found that just over eighteen
months of remaining sentence was sufficient time to litigate a
178. Harris et al., supra note 15, at 467 ('This article reports on decision times in trial
court proceedings for collateral relief, and is the first study of its kind.').
179. Id. at 477, 492.
180. Id. at 477.
181. Id. at 477, 492. The authors also noted that "the norms and culture of post conviction delay are both deeply rooted and widespread in the Commonwealth." Id. at 492.
182. Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 866 A.2d 423, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (Popovich, J.,
concurring and dissenting), affd 909 A.2d 1224 (Pa. 2006).
183. Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), allocatur denied,
848 A.2d 928 (Pa. 2004).
184. According to the study by Harris, Nieves, and Place, less than two percent of the
nearly 4,000 post-conviction cases they monitored in Allegheny, Delaware, and Philadelphia Counties resulted in a new trial or new sentencing hearing. Harris et al., supra note
15, at 490.
185. Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 602 (Pa. 2005).
186. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9543(a)(1)(i) (1998); see also supra notes 60-61, 174-75 and accompanying text and infra
notes 203-07.
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post-conviction petition. 187 With the type of delay prevalent in
Pennsylvania, eighteen months is not enough time for many postconviction defendants to run their ineffectiveness arguments all
the way through the Pennsylvania courts.
A sentence of five years would allow most defendants the opportunity to litigate a post-conviction petition without torturing too
much the concept of a "short" sentence. This still would be a problem for any defendant with an unusually long direct appeal or
post-conviction proceeding, but it would capture most cases when
an exception is needed. This short-sentence exception is not perfect, however, because of the number of defendants who still would
be unable to exercise their constitutional rights to appeal and to
effective assistance of counsel through no fault of their own, i.e.,
because their judicial proceedings dragged on until their sentence
expired. Despite this problem, this solution is better than nothing
at all, and it is something the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can do
by itself without overruling any precedent or turning to the legislature for help. 8 8 If this period would prove to be too short or
even too long, it later could be modified.
C.

Allow Defendants to Raise Ineffectiveness Issues for the First
Time in a Rule 1925(b) Statement

In Commonwealth v. Davido,1 89 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that ineffectiveness issues raised for the first time in a
Rule 1925(b) statement' 90 may not be addressed on direct appeal.' 9 1 The reason for this, however, was because the record was
not complete. 92 If an ineffectiveness issue has been raised in a
timely post-sentence motion and evidence has been made part of
the record in a hearing, however, an appellate court can then consider the ineffectiveness issue. 9 3 The problem with this procedure is that the post-sentence motion must be filed within ten

187. Ostrosky, 866 A.2d at 432 (Popovich, J., concurring and dissenting).
188. As noted above, the O'Berg court did not consider a short-sentence exception in the
context of the state constitutional right to appeal or the defendant's due process rights in
how that appeal is conducted. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. If considered
that way, O'Berg could be distinguished by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court without the
need to overrule it.
189. 868 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 660 (2005).
190. See supranote 26 (explaining what a Rule 1925(b) statement is).
191. Davido, 868 A.2d at 441 n.16.
192. Id.
193. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 853-55 (Pa. 2003).
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days of sentencing, 194 which makes this task virtually impossible
for a new attorney taking the case on appeal.
If the time for raising an ineffectiveness issue is shifted from the
ten days in the post-sentence motion requirement to the time of
the filing of the Rule 1925(b) statement (which identifies for the
trial court the issues to be raised on appeal), 195 then appellate
counsel has a more reasonable time to discover and plead an ineffectiveness issue. Currently, the Rule 1925(b) statement must be
filed within fourteen days of when ordered to do so by the trial
97
court. 196 At the court's discretion, this period may be extended. 1
Depending on how long transcript preparation takes, this will
provide weeks and sometimes months for appellate counsel to
98
identify potential ineffectiveness claims. 1
At this stage, the trial court has lost any jurisdiction to rule on
the ineffectiveness issues.199 The court, however, could take evidence without making a ruling, and write an opinion discussing
this new evidence. 20 0 Trial judges harbor a certain reluctance to
conduct hearings on ineffectiveness issues. 20 1 Because of this institutional lack of enthusiasm for hearings, defendants would
have to be permitted to argue on appeal that the lower court
20 2
abused its discretion in not holding a hearing when requested.
194. PA. R. CRIM. P. 720(A)(1).
195. See PA. R. APP. P. 1925.
196. PA. R. APP. P. 1925(b). A proposed amendment to Rule 1925 would enlarge the time
period to file the statement to twenty-one days.
36 Pa. Bull. 5967, available at
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vo136/36-39/1900.html. One commentator has forcefully argued that the defendant should be permitted six months from the receipt of the
transcripts to identify any ineffectiveness issues. Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at
29-30).
197. Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 778 (Pa. 2005) (recognizing that the appellant could always ask the trial court for more time if it is needed); see also Brensike,
supra note 81 (manuscript at 60) (her proposed rule's time requirement should be a floor of
six months, but not a ceiling "in recognition of the fact that some cases may require more
time.").
198. See Harris et al., supra note 15, at 480. "Obtaining the court file and transcripts
from the archives appears to be a chronic source of delay throughout the state." Id. In
Allegheny County, for example, delays of over six months were reported. Id.
199. Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 758 (Pa. 2005).
200. This is the procedure for a trial court to follow when, pursuant to a post-conviction
petition, it has restored the defendant's right to appeal nune pro tunc. In that situation, it
may not rule on the other ineffectiveness issues raised even though it has presided over a
hearing concerning those issues. Commonwealth v. Miller, 868 A.2d 578, 580-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), allocaturdenied, 881 A.2d 819 (Pa. 2005).
201. See Harris et al., supra note 15, at 489; Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at 3334) ("It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the courts routinely deny defense requests for
evidentiary hearings.").
202. But see Commonwealth v. Davis, 894 A.2d 151, 153-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). In
Davis, the lower court reinstated appellate rights nunc pro tunc, but did not conduct an
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If this is not an option, trial courts will quickly learn that they can
foil any ineffectiveness claim simply by not holding a hearing.
This solution would eliminate all of the problems identified in
Grant and in O'Berg: the record would be complete; the lower
court would have written an opinion; the appellate court would
not be acting as a fact-finder; the appellate attorney would have
sufficient time to investigate; and although the issue would be
raised for the first time on appeal, it would have first been addressed by the trial court.
D.

Allow Unitary Review of the DirectAppeal and the PostConviction Petition

Another suggestion would be to permit unitary review of direct
appeals and post-conviction petitions. In other words, when a defendant has filed a direct appeal and also wishes to argue that
trial counsel was ineffective, the appeal would be stayed while the
trial court considered the ineffectiveness claims. Once the trial
court rendered a ruling, that finding would be consolidated with
the direct appeal in one appeal to the appellate courts. Several
20 3
states employ this procedure.
evidentiary hearing on the other ineffectiveness issues raised in the post-conviction petition. Davis, 894 A.2d at 153-54. On the reinstated appeal, Davis claimed that the lower
court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing and also raised two ineffectiveness
claims. Id. The superior court determined that Grant prohibited it from reaching the merits of the ineffectiveness claims because a record had not been created in the trial court on
those issues. Id. Therefore, the court dismissed the ineffectiveness issues without prejudice to raise them in a post-conviction petition. Id. This created the absurd result that the
defendant filed a post-conviction petition and had his appellate rights reinstated, which
was the worst possible result for him because he was told eighteen months later that he
had to file yet another post-conviction petition to have his ineffectiveness issues considered.
Id. Davis asked the superior court to remand for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court,
but it held that it was unable to remand for an evidentiary hearing. Davis, 894 A.2d at
154.
203. See, e.g., Slusher v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In Indiana,
for example, the procedure works this way:
where it is necessary on appeal to develop an additional evidentiary record to
evaluate the reasons for trial counsel's error, the proper procedure is to request
that the appeal be suspended or terminated so that a more thorough record
may be compiled through the pursuit of post-conviction proceedings. . . . This
procedure for developing a record for appeal is more commonly known as the
DavislHattonprocedure. As we explained, the DavislHatton procedure involves
a termination or suspension of a direct appeal already initiated, upon appellate
counsel's motion for remand or stay, to allow a post-conviction relief petition to
be pursued in the trial court. . . . If the appellate court preliminarily determines that the motion has sufficient merit, the entire case is remanded for consideration of the petition for post-conviction relief. .. . If, after a full evidentiary hearing the post-conviction relief petition is denied, the appeal can be reinitiated. . . . Thus, in addition to the issues initially raised in the direct ap-
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If such a system were employed in Pennsylvania, several questions would need to be answered. Would this procedure be available only to defendants with a short sentence, and what would
qualify as a short sentence? If it would be available to all defendants, would it be optional or would it be mandatory? 2 4 Would it
replace any post-appeal review or be in addition to it?
One initial obstacle to this proposal is that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has already struck down a unitary review system
that was briefly used in capital cases. 20 5 The court would have to
be willing to revisit this procedure. Even with some turnover in
the court, this probably is unlikely.
E.

Reverse the Requirement That a Defendant Must Be Serving a
Sentence at the Time a Court Is Deciding an Ineffectiveness Issue

The PCRA's requirement that a defendant must be serving a
sentence to obtain relief made sense before Grant was decided.
Then, a defendant who chose to fight a conviction could file an appeal and, theoretically, raise any conceivable issue. This defendant would have had at least one opportunity to fully litigate any
issue. After Grant, of course, this is not true for ineffectiveness
issues. Removing the condition that a defendant must currently
be serving the sentence would eliminate the constitutional quan-

peal, the issues litigated in the post-conviction relief proceeding can also be
raised. ... This way, a full hearing and record on the issue will be included in
the appeal. . . . If the petition for post-conviction relief is denied after a hearing, and the direct appeal is reinstated, the direct appeal and the appeal of the
denial of post-conviction relief are consolidated.
Slusher, 823 N.E.2d at 1222. (citations omitted); see also Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at 32 and n. 128) (referencing jurisdictions that use this procedure).
204. In other words, must ineffectiveness issues be raised by using this vehicle at the
expense of waiving them if they are not raised, or would the defendant have the option of
raising them either in unitary review or later in a separate post-conviction proceeding?
205. In 1995, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed the Capital Unitary Review Act
(CURA), which created "a bifurcated, but simultaneous, post-trial review process at the
trial court level for both post-sentence motions and collateral appeal." In re Suspension of
Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d 676, 677 (Pa. 1999) (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9571(c) (1995), suspended by No. 224 Crim. Procedural Rules Dkt. No. 2 (Aug. 11, 1997)).
Less than two years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck this down sua sponte
because it conflicted with existing rules of court regarding how to administer postconviction proceedings and capital appeals. In re Suspension, 722 A.2d at 677-80. The
impediment to resurrecting a similar scheme for short-sentence (or any) defendants is that
the court wants the collateral appeal to follow the direct appeal, not to proceed with it. Id.
at 678-79 ("CURA purported to turn the exclusive process for obtaining collateral review in
capital cases into a 'preappeal' process, whereas the exclusive process embodied in this
Court's rules was, and is, a 'postappeal' process.").
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dary created by O'Berg. Acting on its own, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could remedy this problem in two ways.
20 6
First, the court could find that Commonwealth v. Ahlborn,
which required that a defendant be serving a sentence at the time
post-conviction relief is granted, 2 7 is no longer sustainable after
Grant and O'Berg, at least insofar as ineffectiveness issues are
concerned. The decision in Ahlborn was purely based upon the
language of the PCRA, which requires a person to be "currently
serving a sentence" 208 "[t]o be eligible for relief. ' 20 9 The court reasoned that unambiguous language like this barred any relief once
a sentence is completed regardless of any lingering effects from
2 10
the conviction.
The predecessor to the PCRA, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(PCHA), however, contained similar language, but yet allowed for
consideration of cases with completed sentences if collateral consequences were possible. 2 11 Returning to the PCHA methodology
- at least for ineffectiveness issues - would allow defendants
with short sentences to still litigate these issues. After Grant and
O'Berg divested short-sentence defendants of the opportunity to
argue trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the court could conclude that
revisiting Ahlborn was necessary to correct the problem created by
212
those cases.
Second, the court could find that the PCRA's currently serving
requirement is unconstitutional as it applies to ineffectiveness
issues. In other words, the PCRA in conjunction with O'Berg cannot be used to deprive defendants of their constitutional right to
appeal and their constitutional right to enforce their right to effective assistance of counsel. The court could find the currentlyserving requirement to be generally constitutional, but invalid if it

206. 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997).
207. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720 ('To be eligible for relief a petitioner must be currently
serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole. To grant relief at a time when
appellant is not currently serving such a sentence would be to ignore the language of the
[PCRA] statute.").
208. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (1998).
209. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1).
210. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720-21.
211. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(2), amended by the Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9543 (1988).

212. But see Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 604 (Pa. 2005) (Castille, J., concurring) (Justice Castille, though speaking only for himself, pointed out that Ahlborn preceded
Grant and, thus, the court understood that some defendants with a short sentence might be
unable to obtain relief).
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deprived a defendant of any opportunity to ever argue trial coun2 13
sel was ineffective.
F.

Amend the PCRA to Allow Litigation of Ineffectiveness Issues
Even When a Sentence Is Completed

A final solution is to allow any defendant with an expired sentence to pursue an ineffectiveness issue in a post-conviction petition. Also, if a sentence has expired during the litigation of the
post-conviction petition, the court should still decide it as it would
a direct appeal with a completed sentence.
This would make the ineffectiveness issues more like an extension of the direct appeal rather than a collateral attack requiring
that the Commonwealth have custody and control over the defendant. 2 14 A direct appeal is not moot simply because the defendant
has completed the sentence or even received a sentence of no jail
time at all. 215 If post-conviction ineffectiveness issues were considered in the same way, the defendant's state constitutional right
to an appeal would be fully realized, and the constitutional due
216
process concerns created by O'Berg would evaporate.
This hardly would open up any flood gates to a wave of postconviction petitions. First, most defendants in this category with
a short sentence will not appeal their convictions in the first place.
Often, they are happy with the result and will not try to upset it.
213. But see O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 604 (Castille, J., concurring) (in discussing the currently serving requirement of the PCRA, Justice Castille wrote that he believed that
"[t]here is nothing unreasonable, unwise, or unconstitutional with such a construct").
214. Id. at 603-04 (arguing that the PCRA is only available to those under the custody
and control of the Commonwealth). Perhaps a limit on this extension of the PCRA could be
for claims only involving trial counsel's ineffectiveness. If it was limited to issues of trial
counsel's ineffectiveness, this would mean that the defendant at least would have had one
opportunity to have any conceivable trial issue reviewed on appeal. This would be the bare
minimum to fulfill the guarantee of the right to an appeal in article V, section 9 and it
would remove the due process concerns attached to an appeal. Such a limit, however, could
lead to confusion and extended litigation over the scope (and even the constitutionality) of
such a restriction. To avoid this uncertainty, the Legislature certainly could extend to all
defendants the ability to file after the sentence is completed.
215. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 746 A.2d 1128, 1130-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (en
banc) (an appeal may follow even when the sentencing court, explicitly or implicitly, imposes a sentence of no further penalty), allocatur denied, 764 A.2d 1064 (Pa. 2000).
216. This solution cures only the constitutional problems created by Grant and O'Berg.
It does nothing to remedy the other problems those cases create, such as an innocent person sitting in jail longer than necessary or evidence becoming stale over the extra time it
takes to litigate a post-conviction petition. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
The goal of this article is to find a solution to the constitutional deprivation suffered by the
short-sentence defendant, not to create a global solution to the Grant deferment construct.
For a workable and sensible counter to the Grant framework, see generally Brensike, supra
note 81.
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They would be just as unlikely to file a post-conviction petition.
Second, of the defendants who do want to attack their conviction
or sentence, most defendants who have completed their sentence
will lack the motivation to file and pursue a post-conviction petition. 217 Even many defendants who complete their sentence during the pendency of a post-conviction petition will lose interest.
Third, some issues, by their nature, will become moot in the same
way as if they had been considered on a direct appeal. For example, a defendant who wants to argue that his attorney was ineffective for failing to argue that his sentence was excessive will be
unable to obtain any relief once his or her sentence has been finally served. In other words, even if the sentence was too harsh, a
court can offer no relief such as a shorter sentence after the sentence is completed. The bottom line is that few defendants will
have completed their sentence and still wish to pursue a claim
that their trial attorney was ineffective. Finally, the PCRA's oneyear statute of limitations 2 18 will restrict the number of defendants eligible to file a timely post-conviction petition.
For those defendants who are affected, however, fighting the
conviction is often quite important to them. They may be fighting
their conviction because they are subjected to Megan's Law, 21 9 or
have lost their driver's license, 220 or no longer may own and possess a firearm because of this conviction. 22' In the post-9/11
world, any non-citizen faces deportation for all but the most minor
convictions. 222 For some, it may be the only conviction in their life
and they want their record to be clean. For others who will revisit
the criminal justice system with another conviction, this subsequent conviction may later lead to a sentence enhancement that
can increase a sentence many times over. 223 To these people, the
217.

See Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript at 14).

218.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b) (1998).

219. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9791-9799.5 (2000). For example, a person convicted of a
Megan's Law predicate crime and found to be a sexually-violent predator (SVP) will be
subject to community notification of the SVP status for the remainder of his or her lifetime,
will have to attend monthly counseling sessions for the remainder of his or her life, and will
have to submit to lifetime registration. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9795.1, 9795.4, 9796(a),
9798, 9799.4.
220. For example, being convicted of driving under the influence triggers the suspension
of a driver's license. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3804(e) (2006).
221. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105 (2000) (a person convicted of an enumerated crime may
not own or possess a firearm "regardless of the length of sentence").
222. Manuel D. Vargas, Immigration Consequences of Guilty Pleas or Convictions, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 701 (2006).
223. For example, Pennsylvania's third-strike statute raises a possible sentence from ten
to twenty years to twenty-five to fifty years or even to life without parole. 42 PA. CONS.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 45

conviction may mean drastic changes to their lives, and they will
have the motivation to continue to fight their conviction even after
their sentence is completed. 224
The one drawback to this proposal is that it would require the
Legislature to amend the Post-Conviction Relief Act.
The
amendments the Legislature has made in the past two decades
have been to reduce the availability of the PCRA, not increase
it.225 In Grant, however, both the Commonwealth and the Attorney General were opposed to changing the Hubbard rule. 226 Perhaps a convergence of these forces could convince the Legislature
to take this action to guarantee that all criminal defendants will
227
be able to enforce their constitutional right to counsel.

STAT. § 9714(a)(2) (1998). Even for minor crimes, subsequent convictions may lead to drastically-increased punishment. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3929(b)(1) (1983) (a first retail
theft of under $150 is a summary offense (punishable by up to ninety days incarceration),
but a third or subsequent offense is a third-degree felony punishable by up to seven years
imprisonment).
224. This is why the United States Supreme Court has presumed collateral consequences will follow a conviction. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text. Justice
Castille's O'Berg concurrence is completely insensitive to these consequences. See supra
notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
225. For example, when it amended the PCRA in 1995, the Legislature added the requirement that a petition must be filed within one year of when the defendant's conviction
became final. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b) (1998). It also removed as a ground for relief a
situation involving "[a] violation of the provisions of the Constitution, law or treaties of the
United States which would require the granting of Federal habeas corpus relief to a State
prisoner." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 historical note (1998). See generally Harris et al.,
supra note 15, at 468-74 (chronicling the forty-year history of Pennsylvania's PostConviction Relief Act and its predecessor, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).
226. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 740 (Pa. 2002) (Saylor, J., concurring);
see also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing these positions in Grant).
227. Collateral issues with a rule change like this, though important, are beyond the
scope of this article. For example, defendants with a short sentence have a broad right to
bond pending appeal. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 521(B)(1) says that
"[w]hen the sentence imposed includes imprisonment of less than 2 years, the defendant
shall have the same right to bail as before verdict" unless the court has made a ruling
changing bail. The right for bond during a PCRA proceeding is virtually non-existent.
Commonwealth v. Bonaparte, 530 A.2d 1351, 1355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) ("we conclude that
such motions should only be granted in exceptional cases for compelling reasons"). This
means that a pre-Grant defendant with ineffectiveness issues and a short sentence likely
would have been released on bond pending the appellate decision. A post-Grant defendant
with the same issue likely will be on bond while the appellate courts consider any preserved issues, but will have to report to serve his or her sentence while the post-conviction
process runs its course.
Another important issue beyond the scope of this article is the second-class status afforded
to post-conviction petitions. For example, any defendant on direct appeal may have oral
argument even if the issues are meritless. A defendant on appeal from the denial of a postconviction petition, however, is not entitled to oral argument even if the issues are meritorious. PA. R. APP. P. 2311(b). While this may seem insignificant, it is indicative of the
culture that de-emphasizes and discounts post-conviction petitions regardless of whether
they have merit. See Harris et al., supra note 15, at 492 ("The low status of PCRA petitions
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The application of the Grant deferment rule to short-sentence
defendants in O'Berg violates that group of defendants' constitutional rights to due process and to appeal by depriving them of any
forum in which to vindicate the denial of their constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel. All defendants, regardless of the
length of their sentence or the seriousness of their charges, have a
constitutional right to argue that their trial attorney was ineffective. Which solution is chosen is not as important as recognizing
the problem and, consistent with the Constitution, somehow restoring the ability for all defendants to be certain that they will
not suffer convictions obtained with constitutionally ineffective
counsel.

derives, in part, from the shared perception among the bench and bar that most post conviction claims are frivolous.").
In the new world after Grant, this is important because meritorious ineffectiveness issues
are less likely to be found by courts. See Brensike, supra note 81 (manuscript 4 n.22) (collecting discussions on the small number of post-conviction cases in which relief is granted).
If the institutional mindset starts from a belief that claims are frivolous, post-conviction
defendants face an almost impossible hurdle. Pre-Grant defendants on direct appeal did
not have an easy task to convince a court that their trial attorney was ineffective. For
example, 20.1% of all appellate cases in 2002 (the year that ended with the Grant opinion)
resulted in some relief being granted to the appellant. See Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Annual
Report
2002
at
6,
http:www.superior.court.state.pa.us/ar2002/SuperiorCourt-AR_2002.pdf (the results were
not categorized by issues raised or even by civil versus criminal cases). The study by Harris, Nieves, and Place, on the other hand, found that less than two percent of the nearly
4000 post-conviction cases they monitored in Allegheny, Delaware, and Philadelphia Counties resulted in a new trial or new sentencing hearing. Harris et al., supra note 15, at 490.
Perhaps courts will view PCRA petitions differently after Grant, but institutional biases
like this can be very hard to change.

